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WANTED FOR BEING A PREGNANT TEEN: 







In 2013, Mississippi likely became the first state to require cord blood testing for any 
underage mother who gives birth or undergoes an abortion procedure.1 Under the statute, 
any individual who provides medical care to a minor under the age of sixteen who gives 
birth, when the individual reasonably suspects the pregnancy is the product of statutory 
rape, must collect the umbilical cord and report the birth to law enforcement.2 The statute 
defines “reasonable suspicion of statutory rape” as the mother naming a father who is 
deceased, is over twenty-one years of age, disputes his paternity, or is unnamed.3 
Mississippi enacted this law based on a rationale of reducing teen pregnancy and enhancing 
the prosecution of statutory rape.4 The Mississippi legislature rushed the law into passage 
with near-unanimous approval, barely considering the law’s constitutionality.5 Although 
the new statute addresses a compelling matter in the public interest, direct enforcement of 
minors’ sexual relations and parenthood produces too many consequences.  
The procedure for blood testing minor mothers in Mississippi’s statute presents a 
grave encroachment of several rights. Establishing pregnancy as reasonable suspicion to 
report minors to law enforcement intrudes on sexual and patient privacy rights. This Note 
marks the numerous flaws in Mississippi’s innovative yet improper approach to enhancing 
statutory rape law enforcement and reducing teenage pregnancy. Part I analyzes the history 
                                                          
*  Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D./M.A. (expected 2018); B.A., Political Science, the University of 
Southern Mississippi. 
1  Emily Wagster Pettus, New Mississippi Law Requires Cord Blood from Some Teen Moms, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/02/mississippi-law-cord-blood/2611877/. 
2  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-51(5)(a)(ii) (West 2013). Abortion providers for minor patients under the age of fourteen must 
also collect the fetal tissue and report the procedure to law enforcement. Id. at § 97-5-51-5(a)(i).  
3  Id. at § 97-5-51(5)(iii). 
4  Pettus, supra note 1. 
5  Id. 
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and development of teen-pregnancy-prevention policies among states and shows how 
Mississippi’s law both follows and deviates from a protectionist view on minor females’ 
sexuality and their societal expectation to become mothers. Part II criticizes the approach 
of direct criminal enforcement and bodily searches of pregnant minors by observing its 
violation of rights related to criminal investigation, patient privacy, and genetic privacy 
laws. Part III proposes that the seizure and blood testing of a mother’s placental cord and 
discarded fetal tissue invade personal bodily property rights. Finally, Part IV argues why 
searching minor mothers’ bodies is a poor policy in reducing teen pregnancy since state 
programs advancing minors’ access to contraceptives have been acclaimed for actually 
reducing teen pregnancy rates. 
 
I. HISTORY AND PROTECTIVE PURPOSE OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS 
 
A. Purpose of Statutory Rape Laws 
States have historically attempted to prevent sexual abuse of minors through 
statutory rape criminal laws.6 Teenage pregnancy prevention and criminalizing statutory 
rape are intertwined public interests. In fact, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 
emphasized the importance and validity of statutory rape laws before decriminalizing 
sodomy.7 Government interest in promoting economic, social, and medical welfare usually 
forms the basis for enacting statutory rape laws.8 Statutory rape laws also aim to shield 
minors who are unaware of the harm tied to an abusive, coercive, intimate relationship 
with an adult.9 These laws target the sexual relationship between a minor female and an 
adult male since this relationship typically produces greater societal harms, including a 
higher rate of sexually transmitted infections and the risk of impregnating a minor.10 
Establishing paternity may also be a major interest in intervening in minors’ sexual 
relations since less than half of fathers of children born to adolescent mothers are present 





                                                          
6  See Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463 
(2000). 
7  539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003). 
8   Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981). 
9  See Denise A. Hines & David Finkelhor, Statutory Sex Crime Relationships Between Juveniles and Adults: A Review of 
Social Scientific Research, 12 J. AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 300, 306 (2006). 
10  Id. at 306–07.  
11  A.L. Murray, C. Rosengard, S. Weitzen, C.A. Raker, & M.G. Phipps, Demographic and Relationship Predictors of 
Paternity Establishment for Infants Born to Adolescent Mothers, 25 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 322, 323 
(2012). 
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 i. Moral Origins of Statutory Rape Laws 
Statutory rape laws are universally accepted in historical common law as a 
prohibition of premarital sex, but they are an innovation in American criminal law.12 Since 
the late nineteenth century, state statutes have criminalized sexual intercourse with minors 
primarily to protect the purity of girls.13 A unique aspect of statutory rape laws is that they 
permissibly discriminate on gender, particularly in punishing males for violating a girl’s 
virginity.14 States have consistently applied statutory rape laws against men to prevent them 
from having sexual relations with girls, but the reason for protection has altered throughout 
history. The purpose of statutory rape has switched from enforcing morality to improving 
social and economic conditions.15 Originally, states intended to punish males who had 
“ruined” a girl’s chastity and desirability for marriage.16 In the early twentieth century, 
states retained a moral purpose for statutory rape laws, but focused on rehabilitating 
promiscuous behavior among youth, especially girls.17  
 
 ii. Economic and Moral Interest in Present Statutory Rape Laws 
Teen pregnancy remains a major social issue and motivates today’s statutory rape 
laws. Current state statutory rape laws are the products of mixed economic and morality 
interests. There is no doubt teen pregnancy depletes resources and causes economic harm 
to minors. The cost of minors’ parenthood in the United States in 2010 was estimated to 
have been $9.4 billion.18 The average taxpayer paid $1,700 for every child born to a teenage 
mother that year.19 Because minor parenthood drains state resources, states may impose 
tougher sentencing against adult male violators of statutory rape laws due to the risk of 
teen pregnancy.20 
Since the launch of federal welfare programs in the 1960s, states began to focus on 
socioeconomic reasons for overseeing girls’ sexual activities.21 In 1961, teenage mothers 
produced the majority of illegitimate children on welfare rolls.22 In response to a heavier 
welfare burden, state legislatures nationwide denied welfare to mothers who had the father 
                                                          
12  Statutory rape actually derives from English common law, but no state enacted such a statute until 1850, when 
California criminalized intercourse with a girl under the age of ten. See Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of 
Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039, 1058 (2008). 
13  Id. at 1059–60. 
14  See id. at 1060–61. 
15  Id. at 1078. 
16  Id. at 1059–61. 
17  Id. at 1062. Although these statutes were gender-neutral, boys overwhelmingly received criminal sanctions more 
often than girls did. Moral sanctions were more common for girls. Id. at 1063–64.  
18  Stephanie J. Ventura, Brady E. Hamilton, & T.J. Matthews, National and State Patterns of Teen Births in the United 
States, 1940–2013, 64(7) Nat’l Vital Stats. Reps. 1, 2 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_04.pdf. 
19  Id. at 9. 
20  Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. at 470 (1981). 
21  See Levine, supra note 12, at 1065. 
22  Id.  
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present at home.23 Some states proposed to criminalize minor parenthood or to sterilize 
mothers who are minors, but none of these ideas came to fruition.24  
In 1996, a wave of states passed stricter statutory rape laws in response to Congress 
favoring married families in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act.25 Many states viewed teen pregnancy as a major social issue that 
increased costs of providing welfare programs and limiting minors’ education and career 
prospects.26 Many states reformed welfare programs to favor married families27 to comply 
with the policy of Congress’s welfare reform to “prevent and reduce . . . out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies” and promote “two-parent families.”28 One of these incentives was raising the 
age of consent in order to dissuade older men from fathering children with younger girls.29 
Shortly after the passage of welfare reform, several state and local governments raised the 
age of consent, increased sentencing, and added penalties for violators of statutory rape 
laws in an attempt to reduce teen motherhood’s consumption of federal welfare grants and 
preserve funds.30 
 
B. Restrictions on Minors’ Self-Regulation of Sexual Activity 
Currently, states have revived morality as their cause for denying minors’ access to 
birth control. The federal government has recently introduced more restrictions on minors’ 
access to contraceptives because of a social fear of girls engaging in sex for pleasure and the 
risk of teen pregnancy resulting from minors’ sexual behavior.31 Although minors have the 
same right to access contraceptives as adults,32 states consistently expect minors’ sexual 
activities to result in parenthood.33 Half of all states impose conditions or completely 
prohibit access to contraceptive services, including emergency pills and condoms, to 
minors.34 Despite most states’ reluctance to provide minors access to contraceptives, the 
                                                          
23  Id. at 1066 n.121. 
24  Id. 
25  Oliveri, supra note 6, at 468. 
26  Id. at 469–70. 
27  See Levine, supra note 12, at 1077–78. 
28  42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3)–(4) (2012). 
29  Levine, supra note 12, at 1079–78. 
30  Oliveri, supra note 6, at 474–76. 
31  Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, From Sex for Pleasure to Sex for Parenthood, How the Law Manufactures Mothers, 65 
HASTINGS L.J. 211, 233 (2013). 
32  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694–99 (1977); Parents United For Better Schools vs. School Dist. Bd. 
Of Educ., 978 F. Supp. 197, 208–09 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (reversing school district’s ban on distributing condoms to 
students). See generally Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992); Tummino v. Hamburg, 
936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (invalidating executive order restricting sales of emergency contraceptives to 
minors).  
33  Burkstrand-Reid, supra note 31, at 235. 
34  GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies: Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services (Apr. 1, 2016); GUTTMACHER INST., Publicly Funded Family 
Planning Services in the United States, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contraceptive_serv.html (last visited 
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majority of sexually active high school students use some form of contraceptives.35 
Teenagers are also highly likely to use contraceptives for their first sexual experience.36 
Restrictions on contraceptives, combined with statutory rape laws, impose a protectionist 
policy of preventing girls from engaging in sexual activity before they reach maturity, yet 
prefer girls to gain maturity by becoming mothers.37  
 
C.  Mississippi’s Cord Blood Law Deviates from Mainstream Statutory Rape Law 
 Interests 
Mississippi’s cord blood law deviates from the common interest of statutory rape 
laws, which is to prosecute adults who sexually abuse minors. The rationale behind 
Mississippi’s new law is to regulate motherhood and punish sexual abusers, but requiring 
all pregnant minors to disclose the identity of their sexual partners would affect commonly 
occurring and legal sexual relationships between minors. 
With the third-highest teenage-birth rate in the United States, teenage pregnancy 
is a prevalent issue in Mississippi.38 The state’s political leaders often attempt to shed 
Mississippi’s dubious distinction of having one of the highest teen pregnancy rates in the 
nation.39 State officials who passed the cord blood law claimed it was necessary to enhance 
the prosecution of statutory rape.40 Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, who drafted 
the statute, hoped the statute would “deter men over the age of [twenty-one] from having 
sex, particularly with girls [sixteen] years and younger.”41  
Requiring a minor mother to disclose the identity of the father does not protect the 
mother from statutory rape, but rather, punishes the mother for her sexual activity. 
                                                          
Apr. 30, 2016) (“teenagers represented nearly one in four contraceptive clients served by safety-net health centers in 
2010). 
35  More than a quarter (25.3%) of students reported using birth control pills, IUD, shots, patches, or rings. LAURA KANN 
ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE – UNITED STATES, 2013, 63 
Surveillance Summaries 1, 24–27 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6304a1.htm.  
36  GLADYS MARTINEZ ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES: SEXUAL ACTIVITY, 
CONTRACEPTIVE USE, AND CHILDBEARING, 2006–2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH, 23(31) VITAL AND HEALTH 
STATS. 1, 8–9 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_031.pdf. 
37  Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet: Rethinking the Regulation of Adolescent Sexuality, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
271, 291 (2011). 
38  In 2012, there were 46.1 births per 1,000 mothers aged fifteen to nineteen in Mississippi. VENTURA ET AL., supra note 
18, at 20. New Mexico and Oklahoma, with 47.5 and 47.3 births per capita, respectively, had a succeeding rate of 
teenage births. Id. States with the most teenage births had a birth rate four times higher than the states with the least 
teenage births. Id. at 5. Mississippi has consistently topped teen pregnancy rates in the United States, but has had a 
reduction in births to minor mothers similar the national rate. OFFICE OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, Mississippi Adolescent 
Reproductive Health Facts, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs, http://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-health-
topics/reproductive-health/states/ms.html (last updated Nov. 13, 2014). 
39  Politicians in Mississippi commonly emphasize teen pregnancy as a major public concern. For instance, a legislator 
once proposed to require state universities to develop strategies to reduce teenage pregnancy. Ronni Mott, Colleges 
Recruited to Offer Teen-Pregnancy Solutions, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2014/feb/19/colleges-recruited-offer-teen-pregnancy-solutions/. 
40  Jeffrey Hess, Miss. Turns to Cord Blood to Track Down Statutory Rapists, NPR (June 3, 2013, 6:10 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/06/03/188423215/miss-turns-to-cord-to-track-down-statutory-rapists. 
41  Id. 
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Although the statute’s drafters intended to prosecute adult men who sexually abuse 
teenage girls, the statutory language does not limit mandated disclosures to cases involving 
the prosecution of adult fathers.42 Several state courts have condemned using statutory 
rape laws to prosecute minors who engage in sexual activity because prosecution would 
not further the purpose of protecting minors from sexual abuse by adults.43 Sexual relations 
between one minor under the age of consent and another above the age of consent have 
become socially acceptable that states provide such an exception for their statutory rape 
laws known as “Romeo and Juliet Clauses.”44 Most states provide such an exception to their 
statutory rape rules to allow sexual relations between one minor above the age of consent 
and another who is below the age of consent, so long as the age gap is reasonably small.45 
In addition to preventing minors from being prosecuted for consensual sex, Romeo and 
Juliet clauses also ensure consistency of enforcement in states that set the age of consent 
below the age of majority.46 
The broad span of the Mississippi’s cord blood law would also violate its own 
statutory rape law, which provides a three-year gap exception for sixteen-year-olds and a 
two-year gap for fourteen-year-olds.47Although Mississippi and other states have reasons 
in good faith for protecting minors from harm in enacting statutory rape provisions, the 
cord blood law directly invades minor mothers’ medical treatment and violates 
constitutional protections of privacy.48 Perhaps the worst effect of threatening all sexually 
active minors with prosecution is endangering their health. Mississippi’s statute 
criminalizes minors’ parenthood by compelling minors to report the identity of the fathers. 
Fear of the father’s prosecution may convince teenage mothers to forego prenatal care or 
avoid hospitals for medical treatment.49 Removing the privacy of minors’ sexual and 
reproductive activities will produce a chilling effect against seeking medical treatment.50 
 
  
                                                          
42  Id.  
43  B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (purpose of statutory rape is to prevent sexual abuse); In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 
528 (Ohio 2011) (statute was “unconstitutionally vague” for allowing prosecution of minors’ sexual relations); State 
ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007) (prosecuting minors engaging in sex was “absurd”); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 318 
(Vt. 2000) (legislature did not intend to prosecute minors through statutory rape law). 
44  BRITTANY LONGINO SMITH & GLEN A. KERCHER, ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 7–10 (2011), 
http://www.crimevictimsinstitute.org/documents/Adolescent_Behavior_3.1.11.pdf. 
45  Id. at 12 (explaining thirty states’ laws that provide an age range exception for statutory rape). 
46  Joanne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 953–54 
(2011) (criticizing inconsistency of state laws that list the age of consent is lower than the age used to define child 
pornography). 
47  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(c)–(d) (2014). 
48  Policies regulating minors’ sexual activity usually accept parenthood for minors. See Phillis, supra note 37, at 291. 
49  Pettus, supra note 1 (statement of ACLU of Mississippi legal director Bear Atwood). 
50  See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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II. REPORTING A MINOR’S PREGNANCY TO LAW ENFORCEMENT VIOLATES PATIENT 
 PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
A. Patient Privacy Rights for Pregnant Minors in Criminal Investigations 
Mississippi’s introduction of mandated reporting of a minor’s pregnancy to law 
enforcement or any third parties without the mother’s consent clearly violates an 
expectation of medical confidentiality.51 Mandating health providers to conduct a placental 
cord blood test in order to discover the identity of a pregnant minor’s sexual partner 
violates patients’ medical confidentiality rights.52 By deputizing physicians and midwives 
to identify and aid in the prosecution of the fathers of minors’ children, Mississippi’s law 
has serious implications for violating a patient’s expectation of privacy in a medical setting. 
Common law recognizes patients’ reasonable expectation of privacy that their 
medical treatment will remain confidential and their medical providers will not share their 
records with persons other than for treatment purposes.53 There are instances wherein 
states may mandate blood testing of the blood cord or newborn baby, but they are only for 
medical diagnosis and the results are not disclosed to third parties.54 For example, all states 
require genetic screening of newborns for diagnosing genetic diseases and delivering 
medical treatment.55 There are strict limitations on how healthcare providers may handle 
a patient’s personal information outside of medical treatment. Criminal investigation and 
exigent circumstances in which disclosure benefits the patient are the only exceptions for 
disclosing confidential information, and the interest in disclosure must exceed the patient’s 
right to privacy.56 A criminal-investigation interest must comply with statutes governing 
patient privacy57 or the Fourth Amendments special needs doctrine.58 
 
 
                                                          
51  Emily Le Coz, Mississippi Aims to Curb Teen Pregnancy with Umbilical Blood Law, REUTERS (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/07/us-usa-mississippi-babies-idUSBRE9560SL20130607. 
52  Pregnancy and sexuality are particularly sensitive and private matters for minors. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 
(3d Cir. 2000) (school’s order of a pregnancy test on a student served no rational interest). Government officials 
cannot publicly disclose a minor’s pregnancy or sexuality unless it serves a legitimate interest notified to the minor. 
See Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); see also Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 515–18 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
53  Fairfax Hosp. ex rel. INOVA Health Sys. Hosps., Inc. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642, 645 (Va. 1997) (holding healthcare 
providers have a common law duty to protect patient confidentiality). See also R.K. v. St. Mary’s Medical Ctr., Inc., 
735 S.E.2d 715, 720 (W.Va. 2012) (explanatory phrase here is strongly encouraged). 
54  States with blood testing laws may have concurrent protections against disclosing the results. See Higgins v. Tex. 
Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
55  Colin McFerrin, Note, DNA, Genetic Material, and A Look at Property Rights: Why You May Be Your Brother’s Keeper, 
19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 967, 976–78 (2013). 
56  State v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-Golden Triangle, 726 So. 2d 554, 558–59 (Miss. 1998). 
57  Id. at 561. 
58  Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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 i. Duty of Healthcare Providers to Protect Patient Privacy in Criminal   
  Investigations 
State and federal statutes governing the confidentiality of a patient’s personal 
information have strict standards for disclosure to law enforcement. The Health 
Information Portability and Protection Act (HIPAA) prohibits healthcare providers from 
releasing confidential patient records.59 However, healthcare providers may release patient 
records for criminal investigations only under a “subpoena, discovery request, or other 
lawful process.”60 Some states provide the same law with identical standards for disclosure 
to law enforcement.61 HIPAA governs healthcare practices without providing individual 
rights to patients, so only a federal or state attorney can file for its violation.62 The statute 
prohibits and punishes healthcare providers for unlawfully disclosing patient information 
without relieving the patient.63 
To meet an exception for law enforcement use, the government must pass a two-
part test. First, the requested information must be necessary for an investigation and has 
to be specific and relevant for the crime.64 Second, there must be a compelling government 
interest for obtaining the records that outweighs the patient’s privacy interest.65 Law 
enforcement can claim this exception only when judicial or administrative courts have 
approved the request.66 Thus, Mississippi’s law cannot authorize a healthcare provider to 
identify a minor’s sexual partner or draw cord blood without court approval. Instead, 
investigators who wish to obtain a patient’s information must either seek a search warrant, 
subpoena, or administrative court approval.67 For an administrative court approval, the 
evidence sought must relate to a “legitimate law enforcement inquiry,” be specific and 
limited to the purpose sought, and cannot identify the patient.68 
Healthcare providers who must comply with HIPAA will face complications when 
attempting to abide by Mississippi’s obligation to report a minor’s information without a 
warrant. If a healthcare provider refuses to report a minor patient’s pregnancy, he or she 
faces a $500 fine and a misdemeanor charge.69 In cases where healthcare providers’ 
compliance with both HIPAA and state law becomes impossible, HIPAA supersedes 
                                                          
59  42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) (2016). 
60  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (2016). 
61  See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-613(a) (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057.7(a) (West 2013). 
62  Sauter v. Bloyd, No. 3:10CV-P720-H, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134037, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2010). 
63  United States v. Stapleton, No. 12-11-ART-(1), 2013 WL 3935104, at *9 (E.D. Ky. July 30, 2013). 
64  United States v. Zamora, 408 F. Supp. 2d 295, 298 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
65  United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 439 (D. Md. 2009). 
66  Zamora, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 297–98. 
67  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2016). If law enforcement fails to obtain information through either of these procedures, 
they are not liable for HIPAA violations. Stapleton, 2013 WL 3935104, at *9. 
68  § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C). 
69  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-51(6) (2013). 
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conflicting state regulations.70 If a healthcare provider fails to obtain a warrant in an 
attempt to comply with Mississippi’s law, the provider violates HIPAA.71 
 
 ii. Patient Privacy in the Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine 
Searches of patients’ bodies in order to assist law enforcement have been derided as 
an obliteration of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court used patients’ expectation 
of privacy as the basis for striking down a state hospital’s agreement with local prosecutors 
to share data from drug tests on pregnant adult patients.72 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
the Court held unconstitutional the mandatory reporting of patients to prosecutors when 
drug tests revealed cocaine abuse.73 Generally, medical ethics laws prohibit healthcare 
providers to transfer confidential patient records used for treatment to law enforcement, 
unless ethics laws compel disclosure to prevent serious harm to others.74  
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures 
prevents a search of a pregnant minor’s body to obtain evidence in prosecuting the father. 
Searching a person suspected of violating the law requires a reasonable suspicion that the 
person has committed a crime and has substantial “special needs” for which obtaining a 
warrant and probable cause become “impractical.”75 There must be a present and real 
societal harm that is substantial enough to justify warrantless and suspicionless searches.76 
A substantial need to reduce or prevent a legislatively found problem is the crux of a 
statutorily mandated search. Statutes mandating searches without a warrant or suspicion 
are invalid when legislative research fails to find a significant harm cited as the reason for 
such searches.77  
 
 iii. A Minor’s Pregnancy Alone Cannot Establish Reasonable Suspicion 
Federal and state courts have denied that a minor’s pregnancy alone authorizes 
health providers to report a patient as a victim of sexual abuse.78 Courts have shielded a 
minor’s pregnancy from disclosure to third parties without her consent because sexual 
relations receive privacy protection.79 Even though there is a possibility of child sex abuse 
involvement in teen pregnancy, a strong consensus among federal and state courts shows 
                                                          
70  Murphy v. Dulay, 768 F.3d 1360, 1368 (11th Cir. 2014). 
71  See id. at 1377–78. 
72  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). 
73  See id. at 86. 
74  See id. at 81. 
75  See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1500-66 (2013). 
76  See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
77  See Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013) (data showing welfare funds 
abuse was insufficient to require drug testing of all welfare beneficiaries). 
78  See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 
853, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
79  See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (no privacy violation because disclosure was 
voluntary); Planned Parenthood of So. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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states cannot sacrifice privacy protections of minor patients for an enhanced enforcement 
of statutory rape.80 
Mandatory reporting of a minor’s pregnancy to law enforcement is impossible to 
enforce without improperly assuming minor females have sexual intercourse exclusively 
with adult males. Because it is unclear whether an act of sexual abuse produced the 
pregnancy, some jurisdictions have declined to mandate reporting of sexual child abuse 
solely due to pregnancy.81 Pregnancy cannot solely indicate child sex abuse due to the 
uncertainty that an adult impregnated a minor.82 The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit 
Courts agree with this proposition and require a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse and 
a compelling government interest before a healthcare provider reports a minor’s 
pregnancy.83  
Although teen pregnancy is a high societal concern, there has been insufficient 
information drawn to support the suspicion that adult males are the bulk of female minors’ 
sex partners.84 A National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy survey 
revealed 70% of male sexual partners of teenage girls are only one or two years older than 
the female.85 In contrast to the scare of adults impregnating teenage girls, the risk of 
pregnancy lowers as the age gap between a female minor and her sex partner lengthens.86 
Female minors with a sex partner at most two years older have a higher unintended 
pregnancy rate than those with partners six or more years older.87 Since teen pregnancy is 
more often a product of sexual activity between two minors, there is no heightened 
justification for lowering a right to privacy for minors. States definitely have a compelling 
interest in regulating minors’ sexual activities, but not to the point of removing minors’ 
protections as patients.88  
                                                          
80  See Carter, 854 N.E.2d at 876. 
81  A Virginia Attorney General opinion restricted reporting sexual abuse due to a minor’s pregnancy to when a health 
provider identifies an adult as the father. See 2014 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. Sept. 12, 2014. 
82  Because a minor’s pregnancy might have resulted from sexual intercourse with another minor, there is no definite 
cause of child sexual abuse. See, e.g., People ex rel. Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Med. Clinic, 249 Cal. 
Rptr. 762, 768 (App. 3d 1988); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van De Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 379–80, (App. 
1986) (reporting sexual abuse for minors’ sexual activity with individuals of the same age violates minors’ sexual 
privacy rights). 
83  See, e.g., C.N., 430 F.3d at 180; Lawall, 307 F.3d at 790. The 10th Circuit declined to apply patient privacy rights in 
whole to minors due to a compelling government interest in protecting minors from sexual abuse. See Aid for Women, 
441 F.3d at 1120. 
84  See Christine E. Kaestle, Donald E. Morisky & Dorothy L. Wiley, Sexual Intercourse and the Age Difference Between 
Adolescent Females and Their Romantic Partners, 34 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 304 (2002). 
85  Andy Kopsa, What Is Mississippi’s Strict New Teen-Pregnancy Bill Supposed to Accomplish?, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/what-is-mississippis-strict-new-teen-pregnancy-bill-
supposed-to-accomplish/277104/. 
86  See Jacqueline E. Darroch, David J. Landry & Selene Oslak, Age Differences Between Sexual Partners in the United 
States, 31 FAM. PLANN. PERSPS. 160, 165 (1999). 
87  Id. 
88  See Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My Mom! A Minor’s Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 427–
28 (2011). 
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Furthermore, there is no special need to aggressively prevent teen pregnancy since 
the teenage birth rate has declined in Mississippi by nearly 46% from 1991 to 2012, which is 
close to the nationwide 52% decline rate.89 Because there is no purpose in identifying a 
minor’s sexual partner other than enhancing criminal enforcement in Mississippi’s statute, 
an order for healthcare providers to gather and send a minor patient’s medical information 
or sexual history to law enforcement is invalid.  
 
 iv. Mandated Cord Blood Tests Intrude on Healthcare Privacy Expectations 
When evaluating the invasiveness of a bodily search, the constitutionality of the 
search can be observed in the method of collecting bodily samples and the extent to which 
the person subject to a sample collection reasonably expects a reduction of privacy. In 
Maryland v. King, the Court upheld the collection of cheek swab collections because the 
procedure did not involve “surgical intrusion[s] beneath the skin.”90 Courts thus consider 
the entrance of a person’s body when measuring whether a search procedure is invasive.91 
The procedure of collecting placental or umbilical cord blood does not actually invade the 
mother’s body. After the mother releases the placenta in afterbirth, attending physicians 
or midwives collect the umbilical cord.92 Then the collector clamps both ends of the cord 
that connects the placenta to the newborn and pours the blood into a container.93 The 
mother does not feel anything from the collection of placental blood in addition to pain 
from afterbirth.94 Although this procedure does not seem invasive to the human body, the 
context of extracting cord blood absent the patient mother’s consent violates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a healthcare setting.95  
Bodily search of an individual is more acceptable when an individual reasonably 
expects a loss of privacy in the setting where authorities conduct the search.96 The 
reasonable expectation prong does not apply to the retrieval of medical information from 
patients, especially minors, who do not expect bodily searches for a criminal 
investigation.97 Medical patients, especially minors, do not reasonably expect to have their 
confidential medical information sent to third parties without their consent.98 Because 
                                                          
89  Mississippi Adolescent Reproductive Health Facts, OFF. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-health-topics/reproductive-health/fact-sheets/state.html?s=mississippi 
(last updated Nov. 25, 2014). 
90  133 S. Ct. 1958, 1963 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1984)). 
91  See United States v. Fowlkes, 770 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g 804 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2015). 
92  Nat’l Insts. of Health, Cord Blood Testing, MEDLINE (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003403.htm. 
93  Cord Blood Collections, NAT’L CORD BLOOD PROGRAM 
http://www.nationalcordbloodprogram.org/work/collections.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
94  Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 92. 
95  Infra Part III. 
96  See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–31 (2002); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S.  646 (1995).  
97  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). 
98  See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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patients admitted to hospitals or clinics do not reasonably suspect bodily searches other 
than medical treatment or diagnosis, there is no basis for conducting a search for the 
purpose of establishing paternity without the mother’s consent. 
Both bodily searches of suspected drug addicts in Ferguson and of pregnant minors 
serve public safety interests, but invade patients’ privacy and invalidly focus on criminal 
prosecution. States cannot impose broad, suspicionless searches primarily to enhance 
criminal enforcement.99 There must be a non-criminal, public safety interest and an 
effective prevention of conduct that counters that interest.100 Even if the purpose of 
Mississippi’s law is to deter males from engaging in sexual relations with a minor female, 
reporting a minor’s pregnancy ineffectively serves this purpose since males can easily avoid 
detection by using condoms or engaging in sexual activity that does not lead to 
impregnation.101 
 
B. A Pregnant Minor Receives a Right to Medical Information Privacy 
Privacy rights impose a strict scrutiny test in which a compelling government 
interest must outweigh an individual’s right to privacy for the release of medical 
information.102 In jurisdictions that mandate reporting sexual abuse of minors, health 
providers treating a pregnant minor face a conundrum when choosing between violating a 
law requiring them to report a reasonable suspicion of child sex abuse and reporting a 
patient’s confidential information without his or her consent. Most, but not all, federal 
appellate courts recognize that personal medical information is reasonably expected to be 
private and prohibit providers from disclosing personal information absent a compelling 
government interest.103  
Violations of minors’ patient-information confidentiality demonstrate a need for 
greater protection. Medicine is not the only setting that has attempted to violate 
confidentiality for pregnant minors. This problem has been seen in states with a judicial 
bypass system for minors requesting an abortion. Judges often report sexual abuse during 
a proceeding for approving a minor’s requested abortion.104 A pregnant minor should not 
have to surrender her privacy rights in any setting where she reasonably expects 
                                                          
99  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
100  Id. at 47. 
101  Martha Kempner, Can Mississippi Curb Teen Pregnancy and Statutory Rape by Collecting Cord Blood?, RH REALITY 
CHECK (June 14, 2013, 12:37 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/14/mississippis-new-law-collects-
umbilical-blood-to-prevent-teen-pregnancy-and-prosecute-statutory-rape/. 
102  See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (finding that a compelling government interest is needed to release 
information reasonably expected to remain private). 
103  Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (identifying courts that recognize a constitutional right to privacy 
for medical information). But cf. Doe v. Wiggington, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting right to privacy for 
medical information). 
104  See Amanda Warford, Note, The Intersection of Kentucky’s Abortion Parental-Consent Bypass Law and Mandatory 
Child-Abuse Reporting Statute: A Judicial Dilemma and Proposed Legislative Solution, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177 
(2011) (criticizing the application of mandatory sexual abuse reporting in private judicial procedures). 
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confidentiality in receiving medical treatment. The fact that there is no concrete evidence 
that statutory rape comprises the majority of minor pregnancies proves there is no 
compelling interest that justifies reporting a minor’s pregnancy to law enforcement.105 
 
III. COLLECTION OF CORD BLOOD AND FETAL TISSUE WITHOUT THE MOTHER’S CONSENT 
 INVADES PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Mandating cord blood tests for minor mothers who cannot identify their partners 
not only disrupts privacy expectations for patients and sexually-active minors, but also 
removes a right to own and keep private, personal genetic information. Although patients 
cannot claim organs as property, organs have genetic value that provides legal protection 
for patients.106  
 
A.  Property Rights Should Extend to Organs Containing Genetic Information 
Placental cord blood contains important properties, including stem cells and genetic 
information of the mother and her newborn child.107 In addition, cord blood contains 
personal genetic information that belongs to the mother and the child—information that 
can identify the father.108 Because of the vital genetic properties of cord blood, there should 
be strong legal protections against obtaining cord blood without a mother’s informed 
consent. 
Although property rights to personal organs are universally unrecognized, some 
jurisdictions require a patient’s consent for the collection of blood and organs.109 
Additionally, a federal statute prohibits the collection of placental cord blood without the 
informed consent of the donor.110 Congress considered the need for non-coercive 
donations, cultural sensitivity, and patients’ autonomous choice in donating cord blood 
when it set rules for cord blood donations.111 Likewise, states that adopt rules for cord blood 
donations typically require healthcare providers to obtain the informed consent of a 
donor.112  
Property rights of body parts are a relatively recent innovation in some jurisdictions, 
but are influential in strengthening patients’ privacy rights. Because organs and genetic 
                                                          
105  See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1108 (10th Cir. 2006). 
106  See Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
107  See Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord Blood for Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 493, 495 (1999). 
108  See id. 
109  Only admitted patients can claim a right to consent. Weldon v. Universal Reagents, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 1104, 1109–10 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Patin v. Admins. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 770 So.2d 816, 818 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
110  Stem Cell Therapeutic and Research Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274k(c) (2014). 
111  S. REP. NO. 109-129, at 8 (2005). 
112  E.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-32n (2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2175(c) (West 2014) (assessment of health risks and 
religion when informing patients of cord blood donation). 
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material are natural and lack any unique identification, some courts do not afford property 
rights over organs or genetics to patients.113 Organs given for medical treatment or lost 
during medical treatment cannot have ownership due to their classification as gifts or 
bodily waste.114 Collection of the placental cord is non-invasive as its removal is part of the 
normal birthing procedure and may be medical waste, so there is no concern of any organ 
seizure.115 A minor who is subject to a cord blood test cannot claim property ownership over 
the placental cord, but she may benefit from a consent requirement and the right to the 
genetic information contained in the cord blood.  
 
B. Genetic Privacy Laws Prevent Disclosure of the Minor-Parents’ Identities 
The sensitivity of genetic information has led to protections for individuals’ 
disclosure of genetic information. A federal statute prohibits employers from requesting an 
employee’s genetic information and narrows an employer’s disclosure of genetic 
information to law enforcement.116 A few states have adopted genetic privacy statutes that 
prohibit healthcare providers from disclosing an individual’s genetic information without 
the consent of the owner of that genetic material.117 Some of these states grant absolute 
property rights to patients who have had products made with their genetic information.118 
Genetic information demands privacy protections due to medical technology that enables 
third parties to easily identify an individual and certain genetic defects that would 
potentially lead to societal discrimination.119 
Since genetic information has the potential to identify an individual through 
discarded body parts, there should be protections against the collection of bodily products 
without a patient’s consent. Federal circuit courts consider the need for such a protection, 
but are split on what degree of protection there should be for collecting genetic 
information.120 Although circuit courts have unanimously affirmed the federal 
government’s collection of genetic information for convicted felons, there are varying 
degrees of tests for analysis.121 Most courts employ a rational basis test due to the reduced 
expectations of privacy for convicted felons in the collection and storage of their genetic 
information being used for monitoring those on probation.122 Others apply a balancing test 
                                                          
113  See, e.g. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 1990). 
114  Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1166 (2008). 
115  See id. 
116  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1), (6) (2014). 
117  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.161 (LexisNexis 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-43 (West 2014). 
118  E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2014); IND. CODE § 12-31-2-7 (2012) (patient has rights to intellectual property produced 
from her genetic material). 
119  See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring); see also Bearder v. State, 806 
N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 2011) (explanatory parenthetical is recommended here). 
120  United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006). 
121  Id. 
122  See id.; United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); Padgett v. Donald, 
401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546. U.S. 820 (2005); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832.  
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that favors the government when there is a special needs interest in using an individual’s 
genetic material.123 While federal courts have upheld the mandated collection of genetic 
information, they did so for regulating parolees convicted of felonies, who have a lesser 
expectation of privacy.124 The same does not hold for medical patients, especially minors.125 
Obtaining genetic information through a minor mother’s cord blood for a criminal 
investigation obliterates any sense of confidentiality in a patient-healthcare provider 
relationship. Patients must know when any of their genetic information taken for medical 
treatment will be shared with third parties, unless there are overriding government 
interests related to public health and safety.126 Even though the placental cord is biological 
waste or an abandoned body part, the act of acquiring private genetic information for 
criminal investigation is a fearful thought that should need a patient’s consent.  
Some jurisdictions hold that patients have a right to notice when healthcare 
providers use their body parts and genetic information for any purpose that may disclose 
private information to third parties.127 The Arizona Court of Appeals heard a challenge to a 
professor’s collection and distribution of blood samples of tribal members to third-party 
researchers in Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents.128 The plaintiff claimed the 
practice violated an Arizona statute requiring notice to patients for disclosing an 
individual’s genetic information for non-medical use.129 The court evaded the question of 
whether there was a violation of genetic privacy rights when it found the plaintiffs failed to 
serve notice to the defendants on time.130 However, the case demonstrates a need for 
protections against disclosing medically obtained genetic information to third parties.131 In 
Bearder v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on a genetic privacy statute in 
requiring a patient’s informed consent when healthcare providers use a newborn’s genetic 
information for purposes other than genetic screening.132 Parents reasonably expect 
healthcare providers to collect genetic information of their newborn since federal and state 
laws require genetic screening, but providers may not divert from using the information 
outside of medical treatment.133 
                                                          
123  See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2005); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 667 (7th Cir. 2004); Groceman 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). 
124  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006). 
125  Patients do not consent to have their property taken once they are admitted into a hospital. United States v. Neely, 
345 F.3d 366, 369–70 (5th Cir. 2003). 
126  See Big Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631, 657 (7th Cir. 2013). 
127  See Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 775 (Minn. 2011). 
128  204 P.3d 1063, 1066–67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
129  Id. at 1068–69. 
130  Id. at 1066. 
131  Michelle Huckaby Lewis, Laboratory Specimens and Genetic Privacy: Evolution of Legal Theory, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
65, 67 (2013). 
132  806 N.W.2d at 771–74. 
133  Id. at 770–71. 
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Although the Arizona and Minnesota cases depended on statutes recognizing an 
individual’s ownership of genetic information, the Fourth Amendment also prohibits 
obtaining confidential medical information from patients for general law enforcement.134 
Patients who give their blood or any genetic information for medical treatment setting 
must reasonably know when there is a criminal investigation purpose for the collection.135 
Interests in protecting patients’ genetic information privacy rights clearly override any state 
interest in obtaining information on a minor’s sexual activity.  
Seizure of a placenta mandated by statute also complicates the doctor-patient 
relationship between medical providers and pregnant minors.136 Proponents of the 
Mississippi statute claim search and seizure of umbilical cord blood raises no privacy 
concerns because the organ is “discarded,” but invading patient privacy is an unacceptable 
risk of this law. 137 Drawing a minor patient’s cord blood solely to prosecute her partner is 
highly invasive and complicates a minor’s expectations in healthcare.138 
 
IV. REPORTING TEENAGERS’ PREGNANCIES IS NEEDLESS DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF OTHER 
LESS INTRUSIVE, LOW-COST POLICIES 
 
A. The High Monetary Cost of Enforcing Mississippi’s Statute 
While most states have significantly reduced teenage-pregnancy rates, the 
introduction of cord blood testing and directly regulating paternity among minors seems 
excessive. Most states have significantly reduced their teenage pregnancy rates within the 
last decade, particularly with younger teenagers aged fifteen to seventeen years of age.139 
Within this period, teenage birth rates were reduced by at least 35% in a handful of states.140 
The success in decreasing births to minor mothers has been attributed to policies that 
promote sexual education and minors’ knowledge of contraceptive use.141 Policies 
educating minors on sexuality already have proven to be a more appealing solution than 
                                                          
134  Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson I), 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001). 
135  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 229–30 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson II), 308 F.3d 
380, 397 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
136   See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-51(5) (West 2013). 
137  Debra Cassens Weiss, DNA of Babies Born to Teens Under 16 Will Be Collected for Paternity Tests Under New State 
Law, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2013, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/miss._battles_statutory_rape_with_collection_of_umbilical_cord_blood/. 
138  Bodily searches of patients for purposes other than aiding medical treatment has been held to violate patients’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n. 15 (citations omitted). 
139  The national teenage birth rate in this age group has been steadily declining since 2007. VENTURA ET AL., supra note 
18, at 2–3.  
140  Id. at 5. 
141  States with comprehensive sexual education policies that include instructing minors how to use contraceptives have 
seen comparatively lower teenage birth rates than states with a flat abstinence policy. See Pamela K. Kohler, Lisa E. 
Manhart, & William E. Lafferty, Abstinence-Only and Comprehensive Sex Education and the Initiation of Sexual 
Activity and Teen Pregnancy, 42 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 344, 349 (2008). 
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the elevated monetary expense and violation of minors’ privacy in tracking down every 
father of children born to minors. 
The high cost of cord blood paternity testing and the effect of minors avoiding 
healthcare treatment for pregnancy bring an unwarranted health policy for minors. Cord 
blood storage carries a high price tag in addition to DNA testing. Private companies 
specializing in cord blood banking have the exclusivity of setting prices since few public 
banks have yet to be established.142 Storing cord blood at these private banks costs 
thousands of dollars annually, with an annual storage payment that costs $2,895 per year.143 
DNA testing through cord blood has an estimated price of $1,000 per procedure.144 The cost 
of cord blood drawing, banking, and testing only adds to the cost of a minor’s motherhood, 
not to mention the steep expense of childbirth. 
Mississippi’s statute does not mention who will pay for the cost of the DNA 
procedure, banking, or any expense related to investigating a minor’s pregnancy.145 The 
state has not decided who should pay the high cost of storing cord blood and performing 
DNA tests. The Mississippi State Medical Examiner’s Office issued regulations for the law, 
but never assigned who pays the cost of cord blood collection and storage.146 The 
Mississippi Legislature enacted a grant to promote cord blood donations a year after the 
passage of the statute, but expressly prohibited the state from compensating cord blood 
drawing for genetic testing.147 The statute’s absence of any cost designation may permit 
state or local officials to either defer the total cost to the patient or to split the cost of the 
entire procedure with the patient, which will further deter pregnant minors from seeking 
prenatal medical attention.148 Furthermore, placing the cost of cord blood testing onto 
minors would violate a patient’s expectation of expenses related to her pregnancy 
treatment; it would be unethical to surprise a minor patient with the burden of paying the 
cost of complying with a governmental healthcare policy.149 
 
                                                          
142  See Seema Mohapatra, Cutting the Cord to Private Cord Blood Banking: Encouraging Compensation for Public Cord 
Blood Donations after Flynn v. Holder, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 933, 950 (2013). 
143  Id. 
144  Miss. Law Requires Cord Blood to Be Collected from Teen Moms, CBS NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013 5:22 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/miss-law-requires-cord-blood-to-be-collected-from-teen-moms/. 
145  Id. 
146  31-504 MISS. CODE R. § 1.1 (LexisNexis 2013). 
147  The statute authorizing grants to promote cord blood donations expressly prohibits using funds from that grant for 
DNA testing. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-129-1(4) (2016). 
148  Brett Baulsir, Mississippi Law Aimed at ‘Preventing’ Teen Pregnancy Misses the Mark, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L. 
(Oct. 1, 2013, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.networkforphl.org/the_network_blog/2013/10/01/280/mississippi_law_aimed_at_preventing_teen_pre
gnancy_misses_the_mark. 
149  Several states prohibit added expenses for cord blood collection without the patient’s consent. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 32-3210 (2015); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/6.21 (2014). 
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B. Comprehensive Sexual Education and Expanding Access to Contraceptives to Minors 
Is a More Effective Solution to Reducing Teen Pregnancy 
Instead of spending resources on excessively checking on minors’ sexual activity, 
states should be more open to educating minors and increasing minors’ access to 
contraceptives. State subsidized distribution of contraceptives is a low expense and a 
proven method of reducing teen pregnancy.150 Such policies, which enable minors and 
educate them about their sexuality, have the highest success rate.151 For instance, California 
experienced its greatest teenage birth rate decline when it enacted a comprehensive sexual 
education program that instructed students on how to use contraceptives.152 Policies 
enabling minors to gain sexual experience should be expanded rather than redacted to 
effectively reduce teen pregnancy.153 
The most effective strategy to reduce teenage birth rates is expanding minors’ access 
to contraceptives. For rural states like Mississippi, the cost of contraceptives and the 
limited access to health clinics obviates the prevention of teenage pregnancy, which 
explains why rural areas have a higher teenage birth rate than urban areas.154 In solving the 
issue of minors’ access to contraceptives, state and local programs that provide low-cost or 
free contraceptives saw their teenage birth rates fall at a drastic level. For instance, a 
privately-funded program in Colorado that provided intrauterine contraceptives to minors 
reduced the teenage birth rate by 40% in four years.155 A pilot program distributing free 
contraceptives to minors aged fifteen to seventeen years of age initiated by Washington 
University in the Greater St. Louis region greatly decreased the local teenage birth rate.156 
Participants in this program who accepted low-cost contraceptives cut the teenage birth 
rate by 75%.157 Increasing minors’ knowledge about using and ability to afford 
contraceptives should be integrated in states’ teenage pregnancy prevention policies. 
Finally, the concern of minors becoming sexually active at a younger age is nonexistent 
                                                          
150  See Zhou Yang & Laura M. Gaydos, Reasons for and Challenges of Recent Increases in Teen Birth Rates: A Study of 
Family Planning Service Policies and Demographic Changes at the State Level, 46 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 517 (2010) 
(holding that state Medicaid subsidies for contraceptives to teenagers). 
151  See generally Pamela K. Kohler et al., supra note 141, at 348 (2008). 
152  Heather D. Boonstra, Winning Campaign: California’s Concerted Effort To Reduce Its Teen Pregnancy Rate, 13 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 18 n.2 (2010). 
153  Sexually active minors are less likely to seek medical assistance for pregnancy in response to harder regulations on 
contraceptives since they fear repercussions for admitting to violating age of consent laws. Phillis, supra note 37, at 
295–97. 
154  See Laura Sessions Stepp, Rural America Has a Teen Pregnancy Problem, CNN (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/27/opinion/stepp-teenage-pregancies/. 
155  Caitlin Schmidt, Colorado Teen Birthrate Drops 40% with Low-Cost Birth Control, CNN (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/10/health/colorado-teen-pregnancy/index.html. 
156  Gina M. Secura et al., Provision of No-Cost, Long-Acting Contraception and Teenage Pregnancy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1316 (2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1400506#t=articleTop. 
157  Id. 
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since minors who have access to contraceptives at an earlier age do not alter their sexual 
behavior.158  
One obstacle to comprehensive sexual education curriculum is the adamant 
resistance of one of the more effective means of reducing teenage pregnancy. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) established a 
federal grant program that has incentivized states to teach an abstinence-only sexual 
education.159 States accepting this grant must exclusively instruct students of the physical, 
sociological, and psychological harms of pre-marital sexual conduct and negatively portray 
contraceptives by depicting them as inferior to abstaining from sex in preventing 
pregnancy.160 Thirty-seven states in fiscal year 2011 accepted this grant; six of those that 
applied had not applied the previous year.161 Abstinence-only curriculum is popular among 
public schools due to parents’ and students’ objection to content that is sexually explicit or 
offensive to their religion.162 If parents feel concerned about schools instructing their 
children to use contraceptives or the schools’ usage of sexually explicit material, schools 
may provide an option for parents or students to withdraw from the lesson.163 
Recent national policy recognizes a sexually active youth audience, yet still 
promotes abstinence. In 2010, the federal government introduced the Personal 
Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which granted states monetary aid to teach 
condom and contraceptive use in addition to abstinence in order to prevent and reduce 
pregnancy for women less than twenty-one years of age.164 States accepting this grant must 
include medically accurate and age appropriate instruction.165 Through the 2014 
Congressional fiscal year, this program financially aided states to train youth for financial 
                                                          
158  Minors who first have sex at fifteen years of age have a similar contraceptive use as seventeen and eighteen year olds. 
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131 PEDIATRICS 886, 889 (2013). Minors under thirteen years of age considerably use contraceptives less often, but the 
minute amount of sexually active minors in this age group is too small to warrant such an interest in prevention. Id. 
159  42 U.S.C. § 710 (2012); Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only Education: Minors Have 
a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 12, 28–29 (2006). 
160  Id. at 36–38. Although participating states may present a viewpoint against using contraceptives, they must rationally 
relate to promoting abstinence. States’ free use of an abstinence-only curriculum has produced conflicting results on 
what is appropriate. See Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Sch. Bd., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (excluding 
gay rights student group unrelated to sexual education). Cf. Caudillo ex rel. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 
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162  See Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (sexual content); 
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163  Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2003). 
164  42 U.S.C. § 713(b)(2)(B) (2012).  
165  Id. 
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literacy, education, and healthy sexual relationships, and promoted sexual abstinence.166 
Only two states, Indiana and North Dakota, opted out of PREP participation.167 
Although most states readily accepted comprehensive sexual education, local school 
districts varyingly interpret curriculum standards.168 When Mississippi introduced the 
option for public schools to include birth control methods and contraceptives into their 
sexual education curriculum, less than half of the school districts adopted a comprehensive 
sexual education program.169 On the contrary, a poll from the Center for Mississippi Health 
Policy demonstrated a majority of parents prefer a curriculum that teaches students how 
to use contraceptives.170 Public schools’ obstruction to instruct students how to use 
contraceptives ignores the reality of teenagers’ active sexuality; Mississippi teenagers are 
more sexually active than the nationwide average.171 Surprisingly, Mississippi teenagers are 
more likely to use condoms, which demonstrates a necessity for instructing contraceptive 
use.172 Despite teenagers’ experience with contraceptives, Mississippi bars schools with an 
abstinence-plus curriculum from demonstrating how to use condoms and contraceptives, 
although it permits a discussion on birth control.173 The statute prohibiting contraceptives 
demonstrations has, in fact, been enforced at least once.174 Since Mississippi’s teenage 
population is among the most engaged in sexual activity and contraceptive usage, the 
state’s teenage-pregnancy-prevention policy should reflect reality rather than appeal. 
Officials should focus on preparing teenagers to actively prevent teenage pregnancy, not 
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CONCLUSION 
 In developing a policy regulating minors’ sexual activity, states should be aware of 
the sensitivity and importance of confidentiality in medical care. Mississippi’s plan to 
remove its status as having one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates fails to acknowledge 
minors’ needs for sexual education and their vulnerability to perceive government 
intervention as punishment. For this reason, criminalization is an inappropriate approach 
to reducing teenage pregnancy. Reducing the cost of minors’ access to contraceptives has 
proven to dramatically decrease teenage birth rates, but many states are unwilling to 
implement this solution due to social controversy.175 States need to understand that 
teenage pregnancy must be treated as a medical concern instead of a criminal matter. 
Because teenage pregnancy has declined in recent years due to teenagers’ autonomous 
prevention of parenthood, there is no reason for Mississippi or any other jurisdiction to 
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